The original BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa — formalized in 2009 as a loose coordination mechanism. The 2024 expansion added Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE (with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and others in various states of association). On paper the expanded bloc represents about 35 % of global GDP at PPP and roughly half of the world's population. The actual policy weight is less clear.

What the bloc can do

  • Coordinate at international fora. Joint positions at G20 and UN votes, more aligned messaging on sanctions regimes, climate finance, and IMF reform.
  • Run the New Development Bank. ~$30 B of authorized loans focused on infrastructure in member countries. Useful but small relative to World Bank or AIIB scale.
  • Provide an alternative venue. The BRICS Summit gives leaders excluded from G7 a high-profile coordination opportunity.

What the bloc can't do

Three structural limits make BRICS+ a weak bloc compared to the EU or NATO equivalents:

  • No binding rules. No common tariff, common currency, or treaty framework with enforceable obligations. Decisions are consensus-based; a single member can veto.
  • Member rivalries. India and China have unresolved border tension and strategic competition across the Indian Ocean. Egypt and Ethiopia disagree on Nile water rights. Iran and Saudi Arabia normalized only in 2023 after decades of proxy conflict.
  • Economic asymmetry. China's economy is larger than all other members combined. Any "BRICS currency" or settlement system that emerged would in practice be a yuan-denominated system — which most other members are reluctant to adopt for the same reasons they avoid dollar dependence.

What the new members actually want

The accession motives are revealingly varied:

  • UAE — diversification of strategic partnerships consistent with hedging between US and China, and a venue to amplify diplomatic weight beyond the GCC.
  • Egypt — economic relief: Chinese and Indian financing, reduced exposure to dollar fluctuation, and IMF-program optics.
  • Iran — sanctions evasion infrastructure: BRICS payment-rail experiments offer parallel channels around US financial sanctions.
  • Ethiopia — a low-leverage member using BRICS to attract financing for its industrial-policy push and the Renaissance Dam dispute optics.

The de-dollarization question

BRICS-led de-dollarization gets disproportionate headlines. The reality is incremental: ~20 % of intra-BRICS trade now settles in non-dollar currencies, up from near zero a decade ago. Meaningful displacement of the dollar would require a credible alternative reserve asset — neither the yuan (capital controls) nor a synthetic basket has emerged with anywhere near the depth needed. The shift is real but slow.